As per the requests from Mr Sahil,our dear reader,We are publishing the following marksheets....Kindly make sure while making further requests regarding mark sheets of not recommended candidates We require atleast roll numbers. In case of successful candidates we do require only one data either name,rank or roll number.
********************************************************************
Roll No. : 67177
Name : CHANCHAL YADAV
Rank 83
Civil Services(Main) Examination 2007
Subject Maximum
Marks Marks
Obtained
Essay(Paper III) 200 116
General Studies (Paper-IV) 300 170
General Studies(Paper-V) 300 167
Optional I,Political Science & Intnl. Rel. Paper-VI 300 167
Paper-VII 300 187
Optional II, Psychology Paper-VIII 300 129
Paper-IX 300 166
Penalty Marks 0
Written Total 2000 1102
Interview Marks 300 204
Final Total 2300 1306
Remarks : Recommended.
***************************************************************88
Roll No. : 83763
Name : RUPANJALI
rank-53
Civil Services(Main) Examination 2007
Subject Maximum
Marks Marks
Obtained
Essay(Paper III) 200 135
General Studies (Paper-IV) 300 199
General Studies(Paper-V) 300 145
Optional I,Psychology Paper-VI 300 176
Paper-VII 300 160
Optional II, Sociology Paper-VIII 300 134
Paper-IX 300 144
Penalty Marks 0
Written Total 2000 1093
Interview Marks 300 230
Final Total 2300 1323
Remarks : Recommended.
************************************************************************
Roll No. : 4399
Name : ASHISH SINGHMAR
Rank-148
Civil Services(Main) Examination 2007
Subject Maximum
Marks Marks
Obtained
Essay(Paper III) 200 096
General Studies (Paper-IV) 300 189
General Studies(Paper-V) 300 182
Optional I,Geography Paper-VI 300 173
Paper-VII 300 177
Optional II, Mathematics Paper-VIII 300 168
Paper-IX 300 133
Penalty Marks 0
Written Total 2000 1118
Interview Marks 300 165
Final Total 2300 1283
Remarks : Recommended.
Saturday, July 19, 2008
READ ON POLICE REFORMS
It is tragic that as India is marching ahead in numerous indicators of human development index, the police as the key institution of internal security, far from being democratised and responsive to the needs of the common man in the country, stands deinstitutionalised, discredited and delegitimised. It carries the image of being a repressive instrument of the state that functions only to protect and for the interest of politicians, many of whom are criminalised.
The existing police systems in India is a legacy of colonial rule that have been shaped by post-colonial histories. The consequences of poor policing include brutality and torture, extra-judicial executions, a lack of due process, impunity, corruption, bias and discrimination and public fear, anger and resentment
Those who have visited a police station any time can tell the tales of horror and disgust. It is a truth that a majority of law-abiding Indians would like to avoid stepping into a police station. Nor would they like to be visited by a policeman in public view. It is unfortunate that this is so even five decades after we became free from alien rule.
In year 2006, the mystery of missing children, unravelled in Uttar Pradesh’s industrial-residential suburb to Delhi, Noida, underlined some known facts about the police. First, the police in India are inefficient, irresponsible, insensitive and corrupt and the maladies now affect not only the cutting edge level, for long touted as the problematic core of the organisation, but it has spread across the organisational ladder to the top, despite some shining examples of excellence and probity. Second, the need for organisational and systemic reforms for this crucial institution of governance, urgent for decades, has now become emergent. Third, the political class running the machinery of the Indian state at different levels is least interested in police reforms for known and obvious reasons.
Besides,the police across the country has been known to avoid registering cases in order to keep the crime rate and work load low for decades; it is the poor who invariably bear the brunt of their inefficiency, corruption and brutality. The registration of the First Information Report (FIR), the initial complaint by affected persons before the police take cognizance of an unlawful incident or crime, has for long been used by the police as an instrument to extort money from and harass the complainants. It is, therefore, not surprising that the police turned away the poor complaining about their missing children from the police station with characteristic disdain. Starkly, a high-profile kidnapping in the posh Sector 15A of Noida in 2006 witnessed an unprecedented police (and the media) mobilisation, while the series of disappearance of children during the past two years in the impoverished part of this urban village drew apathy, scorn (for the poor victim families) and negligence from the police. Considering that Noida is a district town with seats of the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police not very far away from the scene of the occurrence, the incident also clearly brings out the complete absence for the citizens of channels of appeal to the senior officers in cases of negligence and dereliction of duty at the lower levels. Clearly, the class bias of the police, nay the entire administrative structure, always there, has been perpetuated over the decades and has become a systemic feature even as Indian democracy matures.
apart from it,the pervasiveness of dereliction of the basic duty by the police has recently been revealed also during the trials of Priyadarshini Mattoo and Jessica Lal cases in the nation’s Capital. In both the cases the Delhi High Court passed heavy strictures against the Delhi Police. The police was found deficient in taking cognisance of and investigating both the cases. In fact, the involvement of a senior police officer’s son in the former prompted the police to not only ignore the complaint of the victim, but also to resort to shoddy investigation, which in any case has become the soft underbelly of policing in India. The organisational rot is visible also from the rising cases of recorded custodial crime—death as well as rape—by the police. It has risen by 50 per cent in the country between 2004 and 2005. Abdul Karim Telgi’s stamp scam cast its shadow even over the hallowed chair of the Mumbai Police Commissioner. Inspector General rank police officers are facing trial in heinous crimes like murder. Obviously, the Indian Police Service, one of the two prestigious all-India services, has lost its sheen both in probity and efficiency. The pressure of and unpreparedness for facing challenges like terrorism and armed crime in a systematic and organised fashion has led to encounter deaths. The most glaring result of such a pressure was visible in Delhi nearly a decade ago when an innocent person was shot dead after a chase in the busy commercial hub, Connaught Place. Obviously, the pervasively deep rot necessitates comprehensive reforms at every level, incorporating every aspect of policing, though the delivery level deserves urgent and immediate attention.
Thus Police reforms are the crying need of the time which aims to realise increased demand for and achievement of police accountability and reform throughout the country.There is near unanimity among a cross-section of our opinion leaders, be they politicians, administrators, academics or members of the press, that there is something rotten with the system, and that the police will have to change radically in order to become people-friendly. The specific charges hurled by the common man are that the police are corrupt, brutal and insensitive to the poor. Perhaps the most damaging accusation is that the police are biased in favour of the majority community and do not protect the minorities when there is religious tension. The reports of a number of inquiry commissions will bear this out. We are aware of what happened in Gujarat and how the police there have been squarely charged with looking the other way when fundamentalists were indulging in savage behaviour. Against this backdrop, there is a widespread feeling that all the ills of the police are due to the acute politicisation of the system, and that no reform exercise will ever succeed till politicians agree not to interfere with the day-to-day operations of the police. Autonomy for the police without loss of accountability is the slogan that is raised in chorus by a chunk of the pro-reform lobby.
EARLIER EFFORTS FOR REFORMING POLICING IN INDIA
SEVERAL aspects of the police administration— organisational structure, work culture, training, politicisation, accountability structures, magisterial control, corruption, brutality, etc.— have been discussed and reviewed in order to bring about reforms since independence. Interestingly the government of United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh after independence) appointed a Police Reorganisation Committee on January 23, 1947, which reviewed the ills plaguing the police organisation, like corruption, misuse of authority, brutality and so on, and also discussed the reasons behind ills like non-registration of First Information Report (FIR), poor investigation, fabrication of evidence etc.
While recommending some organisational rearrangements, the Committee laid great emphasis on recruitment policy, better salary and service conditions, training ,professionalisation and specialisation of the personnel and various units of the police, inculcation of scientific methods of investigation and creation of a special unit for it.
However, the discourse on police reform began after independence at the State level in the 1960s, when several States appointed Police Commi-ssions to look at police reforms within the framework of the 1861 Police Act. The Union Government obviously adopted a textbook constitutional position by leaving this matter of the List II of the Seventh Schedule (state list) entirely to the States, though given the political atmosphere of the time and the prevailing ‘Congress system’, to use Rajni Kothari’s famous formulation on India’s one-party dominant system, it was possible for the Union Government to undertake a leader’s role in guiding and coordinating police reforms. For, the Centre alone could have contemplated replacing the Indian Police Act 1861 that designed and founded the present police ‘force’ in the aftermath of the events of 1857 with one drawn in accordance with the new republican Constitution enacted in 1950. Anyway, the State governments appear to have been governed by their own political imperatives to set up Police Commissions and accordingly defined their terms of reference. Thus, throughout the 1960s and 1970s one State after the other reviewed its police system (some did it even more than once), but none of the States authorised its Commission to question the Act of 1861 in any way. Naturally, solutions were suggested within the existing framework. The recommendations of these Commissions were mainly concerned with details of the administrative set up, the strength of the police force in different wings of the system, pay and allowances of the police in different ranks, qualifications for recruitment to various ranks, the set-up for training centres, curricula for training and the like.
However, the Union Government too felt the need to review the functioning of the police in the context of the administrative reforms. Hence, without meddling with the State realm, the Centre reviewed administrative structures and training in the 1970s, but the recommendations remained on paper. The Dharam Vira headed National Police Commission in 1977 came after three decades of inaction to reform this vital institution of governance and its growing decadence under political patronage. Its appointment however, was under the shadow of the misuse of the police machinery and the police behaviour during the Emergency imposed by Mrs Gandhi. In severe indictment of the police the Shah Commission of Inquiry appointed to look into excesses committed during the Emergency said:
"The police was used and allowed themselves to be used for purposes, some of which were, to say the least, questionable. Some police officers behaved as if they were not accountable at all to any public authority. The decision to arrest and release certain persons were entirely on political considerations, which were intended to be favourable to the ruling party. Employing the police to the advantage of any political party is a sure source of subverting the rule of law. The government must seriously consider the feasibility and desirability of insulating the police from the politics of the country and employing it scrupulously on duties for which alone it is by law intended."
Obviously, despite a stupendous task accomplished by the NPC, the shadow of the Emergency and the observations against the police and the Indira Gandhi regime during the Emergency was likely to fall on its recommendations. The defeat and fragmentation of the Janata Party regime and return of Mrs Indira Gandhi in 1980, when the report of the Commission was eventually presented, created a negative political atmosphere for the NPC report, making the new regime look at the report with politically coloured glasses.
If we ask for a status report on the NPC reports, we will get impressive but deceptive statistics. You will be told that more than 90 per cent of the NPC recommendations have been implemented. What you will not be told is that three of the most crucial ones are yet to see the light of day. The first of these relates to the setting up of a State Security Commission that will not only evaluate the performance of the police but also entertain representations from officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above against being subjected to illegal or irregular orders. Such a Commission - headed by the Minister in charge of the police and in which one of the six members will be from the Opposition in the legislature - could greatly reduce the frequency of wrongful and unethical directions to officers, either by the police leadership or by the political executive. The second is choosing the Director-General of Police of a State through a clinical process and conferring on him a mandatory tenure of four years. Finally, the NPC recommended the replacement of the Police Act, 1861, with a new Act that takes care of the current times when we need a swift-acting police that is not hampered by an obstructive Executive Magistrate, especially during major law and order situations. The NPC actually went to the extent of drafting a model Police Act, which plugged several lacunae in the old Act and submitted it for government acceptance. The mandarins in North Block have been dragging their feet over this since 1981, obviously because the new Act makes the police mostly free from the Executive Magistrate and the political executive. While the first two recommendations need action by State Chief Ministers, in respect of the third, both Parliament and the State legislatures are competent to bring forward a Bill that could become the new Police Act applicable to the whole country.
Yet, despite being jettisoned, the NPC report has led the urge and quest for police reforms amidst strong political, bureaucratic and internal resistance. It indeed set an agenda for all the future discourses on police reforms.
The successive committees—Rebeiro (1998), Padmanabhaiah (2000), Malimath (2000), which situated the police reforms in the Criminal Justice System framework and Soli Sorabji (2005), appointed to draft a new Police Act—have used the NPC report and recommendations therein as the reference point. The Rebeiro, Padmanabhaiah Committees were appointed to honour the directive of the Supreme Court of India to the Government of India in response to the petition for police reforms by Prakash Singh to identify action points for the implementation of the recommendations of the NPC. The Rebeiro Committee laid great emphasis on introducing institutional and scientific approaches to streamline the affairs in police departments across the country. It did not claim to make a major departure from the NPC recommendations, for many of its suggestions referred to the NPC report for a detailed reference; it updated the report keeping in view nearly two decades of developments since the NPC made its recommendations. This committee too followed the institutional approach of the NPC and the Rebeiro Committee. There were minor variations such as the two-year minimum term for a State Police chief as compared to three years preferred by the Rebeiro Committee and so on. Some of its recommendations, such as recruitment of more Sub-Inspectors than constables, without a comprehensive view of the entire organisational structure, were debatable, to say the least. However, the Committee did emphasise the fact that without a comprehensive criminal justice reforms, no police reforms would be meaningful.
Not surprisingly, almost around the time that the Padmanabhaiah Committee was appointed, the Malimath Committee for the review and reform of the Criminal Justice System was also appointed. The Malimath Committee addressed the principles of the Criminal Justice System, investigation, prosecution, judiciary, crime and punishment and made 158 observations and recommendations. There are 55 major recommendations of which 42 have to be implemented by the Union Government and 26 by the State governments. The report has been heavily criticised by human rights organisation and legal experts for its suggestion of changing the burden of proof.
Though the numerous recommendations of various police reforms commissions are not a panacea for all the ills of the police. Police leaders, present and past have no doubt failed to bring about an ambience in which the executive could have been convinced of the need for reforms. The gulf of a lack of trust between the two remains unbridged. But this is no argument for stalling reforms. The silent majority in the country needs the reforms badly.
THE DIRECTIVES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
It is a matter of coincidence that when the Soli Sorabji Committee has been at work to draft a new Police Act, the Apex Court judgment compelled the Union Government to speak to the States for implementing the guidelines for police reforms.
The Supreme Court has acted on the petition of Prakash Singh, former DGP and directed the Centre and all states to implement police reforms that have been in the cold storage for almost 25 years now when the National Police Commission recommended reforms for the police force between 1977 and 1981.
The Supreme Court judgment of September 22, 2006, has sparked a national debate on police reforms aimed at removing any scope of political or other extraneous interference and influence in discharging its functions.
In directing the Government of India to bring about police reforms within a time frame, the Apex Court has taken into account the suggestions made by the Sorabji Committee too. Based on the exercises carried on by various committees, it made a seven-fold recommen-dation aimed at ensuring accountability, responsiveness and loosening of political control in order to spur depoliticisation of the police organisation as follows:
First, appointment of a State Security Commission ‘to ensure that the State Government does not exercise unwarranted influence or pressure on the State Police and for laying down the broad policy guidelines so that the State Police always acts according to the laws of the land and the Constitution of the country’.
Second, it recommended selection of the Director General of Police of the State from amongst the three seniormost officers of the Department who have been empanelled for promotion to that rank by the Union Public Service Commission on the basis of their length of service, very good record and range of experience for heading the police force with a minimum tenure of at least two years irrespective of his date of superannuating. The State Government can take disciplinary action, if required, acting in consultation with the State Security Commission and under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules.
Third, the Apex Court also recommended a fixed tenure of two years for police officers on operational duties in the field like the Inspector General of Police in-charge of a Zone, Deputy Inspector General of Police in-charge of a Range, Superintendent of Police in-charge of a district, and Station House Officer in-charge of a Police Station unless it was found necessary to remove them prematurely following disciplinary proceedings against them or their conviction in a criminal offence or in a case of corruption or if the incumbent is otherwise incapacitated from discharging his responsibilities.
Fourth, the Court recommended phased separation of the investigating police from the law and order police to ensure speedier investigation, better expertise and improved rapport with the people, but with full coordination between the two wings.
Fifth, establishment of a Police Establishment Board, a departmental body comprising the Director General of Police and four other senior officers of the Department, in each State was recommended to decide on all transfers, postings, promotions and other service related mattes of officers of and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Apart from making appropriate recommendations to the State Government regarding the posting and transfers of officers of and above the rank of Superintendent of Police, which the government would be expected to give due weight to, it would also function as a forum of appeal for disposing of representations from officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above regarding their promotion/ transfer/ disciplinary proceedings or their being subjected to illegal or irregular orders and generally reviewing the functioning of the police in the State.
The sixth recommendation was to constitute a Police Complaints Authority each at the district level, to look into complaints against police officers of and up to the rank of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, and at the State level, to look into complaints against officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above. Even the composition of these bodies has been suggested by the Apex Court in its directives.
Finally a National Security Commission at the Union level, headed by the Union Home Minister and comprising heads of the Central Police Organisations (CPOs) and a couple of security experts as members with the Union Home Secretary as its Secretary, was suggested to prepare a panel for being placed before the appropriate Appointing Authority, for selection and placement of Chiefs of the CPOs, who should also be given a minimum tenure of two years and for reviewing the service conditions of the CPO personnel.
These are long over-due measures. The requirement contained in the judgment that the SCB's report should be placed before the State legislature is highly salutary, and will enable the elected representatives to play an effective role as the people's watchdogs. The Government should accept the recommendations of the PEB as final without any further meddling. To strengthen the hands of the PCA, it should be empowered to launch disciplinary proceedings and criminal cases straightaway without having to refer its findings to Government for further action. The stipulations for providing for a minimum tenure of service for the DGP and other top officials in the police hierarchy and for separating the law and order responsibilities from crime investigation are also unexceptionable.
Despite general agreement on the urgency for police reform, the opinion has been divided on the directive given by the Supreme Court. Some experts have raised objection to the multi-level accountability structure, which might not make the police so much efficient and apolitical, as tied up in too many knots for functional autonomy. Would it be possible to find so many apolitical and non-partisan persons at different levels? Would it not create another set of interests that would like to be benefited from the proximity with the police? Would the politicians not find ways of getting around such persons by providing them with certain sets of benefits? There has been an agreement for a fixed tenure for the State Police chief for some time. However, a fixed tenure at each level, particularly at the thana level, could be questioned from the perspective of principles of public administration. These are only some of the questions being asked on the directive of the Supreme Court which appears to have been taken in by its crusade against decades of role abdication by the executive in several fields due to political considerations.
SAFEGUARDS AND CONTROLS
However, freeing the police from political interference and manipulation should be subject to appropriate safeguards and controls. Otherwise, any uniformed service, apt to be on a short fuse, can become an engine of oppression. Some of the suggested steps to inculcate the needed degree of accountability and spirit of public service are given below:
The practice of the annual performance evaluation reports on the SPs/DSPs being written by Collectors and on the DGP/IGP/DIGs by the Chief Secretary should be revived.
Taking stringent action on strictures by Courts on deficiencies and omissions in investigation and conduct of cases should be made the special responsibility of the Chief Secretary who should send his report to the SCB.
Other than the PCA, there should be a separate high-power Authority to deal specially with brutalities, use of excessive force, custodial deaths and other misuse of authority by the police.
Departmental proceedings and criminal cases involving the police should be akin to court martial procedures, completed within the shortest possible time of, say, four to six months.
Civil society organisations and individuals should be free to organise meetings, demonstrations and the like in public places after informing the police (to avoid duplication, possibility of clashes and the like), without any need to take prior permission.
A special squad should be constituted for dealing with offences pertaining to social ills (dowry, marriage disputes, untouchability, public nuisance and so on) taking them out of the purview of regular police
WHAT ELSE NEEDS TO BE DONE ?
The first ever National Police Commission (NPC) in independent India (1979-81) went into the role of the constabulary in its very first volume. Its recommendations are yet to receive official attention.Nearly 90 per cent of the police forces in the country is comprised of the constabulary. Unlike in the past, more and more educated men and women are voluntarily joining the police at this entry level, in expectation of a satisfying career. This precious resource will have to be protected. This is not possible under the existing state of affairs, where obedience and servility to the senior officers and the political masters are the main criteria for advancement and placement in meaningful jobs within the police. If professional excellence has to be nurtured, even at the level of the much-maligned constabulary, we owe them the right working conditions in which they can give of their best. Such an ambience cannot come about without implementing the most crucial NPC recommendations that are gathering dust in North Block and in State Secretariats. Meanwhile, we have had a report on the subject, prepared by Julio Ribeiro, that has been submitted by the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Supreme Court, which is looking into a public interest petition demanding implementation of the NPC recommendations.
Besides,Police leaders will have to make criminal investigation more science-aided so as to bring down the incidence of third degree methods during interrogations. DNA testing is the new tool that has revolutionised crime investigation in most parts of the West. While such testing is a costly proposition, funds should not stand in the way of expanding the facility available for this. We have only a few laboratories in the country undertaking this work. In the area of communication, the ambitious project of linking all police stations through the Polnet is still to be implemented in full. Like these, there are several other projects that can transform policing and render it a really state-of-the art professional service.
What we now need is a vision and a new level of dedication to the task of upgrading police skills and morale. A brainstorming session chaired by the president of India, in the presence of the Home Minister and past and present police leaders, should help generate ideas that could impart new dimensions to police reforms. This is the best thing that can happen to the Indian Police.
The police is a neglected area where the stranglehold of past practices and the executive's unconcealed desire to use it against political opponents stifle the germination of new ideas. The stock of the police is so low that new experiments can only improve its image and not cause any further damage. A strong political will power to implement police reforms will be hailed by all sections of society if it can, even marginally, make the police more people friendly.
OBSTACLES
MANY of the States predictably objected to the Apex Court directive. The States felt that it was too simplistic to blame political interference for decline in working of the police. They appeared opposed to any move, like the role of the UPSC in the selection of the DGs, that would undermine their authority and bring in the influence of the Union Government. They were also against fixed tenures for the police officers on operational duties like the SHO, which they felt would create ‘monsters’ in police stations. They also claimed to have accountability structures and fresh ones would add to the cost. Some non-Congress Chief Ministers even accused the Union Home Minister of playing politics with police reforms.
This has created a situation of contest and confrontation on the issue of police reforms, with the hardening of attitudes of the Apex Court and of the State governments. India’s federalised polity has weakened Central initiatives in national politics and policy arenas and, therefore, it also creates contestation between the Union Government and some of the States on this crucial issue. While the State governments could have a valid point or two on the recommendations made by the Supreme Court, it is imperative that they need to be circumspect on their objections. This situation has come because once the State initiatives failed by mid-1970s, the main discourse on police reforms has been located on the turf of the Union Government. The Supreme Court too did not find it anomalous to direct the Union Government, rather than the State governments, to implement police reforms, though it did stress that the recommendations were binding on the State governments too.
Therefore, the resistance of some of the Chief Ministers during their meeting with the Union Home Minister on January 2, 2007 on federal grounds is constitutionally and politically untenable. The States were given the initiative to initiate police reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, but the exercise remained fruitless or mechanical exercises despite some of the State Police Commissions giving useful recommendations from social and political perspectives, limitations imposed by the 1861 Act notwithstanding, which they could not alter. Though some of the States appointed two Commissions between the 1960s and 1980s, most of them ignored a large part of the recommendations by their respective Commissions. Moreover, the NPC as well as all the post-1998 initiatives were taken by non-Congress governments and most of the leaders and parties, objecting to the Apex Court directed UPA initiative, have been part of it. Given the urgent need for it, they all need to put police reforms above their political compulsions and come to a national political consensus on the nature of police reforms.
A careful look at the Constitution of India suggests that entries 1 and 2 of List II read with Entry 2A of List I (Union List) in the Seventh Schedule do not preclude the role of the Union Government in internal security, of which the police is just an instrument. Entry 2A was inserted by the controversial 42nd Amendment by Mrs Indira Gandhi during the Emergency, but it was not undone by the 44th Amendment authored by the Janata Government. Indeed, the argument that the Centre must not interfere with the day-to-day maintenance of law and order is unexceptionable. But the need for a new Police Act and the place of the police in the larger criminal justice system creates a leader’s role for the Union Government in this exercise, which must be accepted by all the States, beyond partisanship. Indeed, it is equally unexceptionable that the Union Government too needs to look at its leadership role in a coordination mode.
The Supreme Court’s directives on police reforms has met with serious opposition. Several states, including Gujarat, Bihar, West Bengal, Maharashtra and those from the North-East, have said that they may move the apex court before its December 31 deadline for implementation.
The argument is that since police is a state subject, the Supreme Court has no locus standi to give directions. The states in their individual representations in a meeting of Chief Secretaries and DGPs of states and Union Territories chaired by Union Home Secretary said that the states are against division of policing into law and order on one side and investigations on the other.
While Meghalaya and Mizoram sad that their districts are widely scattered and thus it is not possible to divide their police team, the states of Gujarat and Bihar were critical of the suggestion to hand over the selection of a DGP to a panel. The states also read from the affidavits they had submitted before the Supreme Court and hinted that they may go for revision, according to reports. .
However, Union Home Secretary made it clear that the states have to adopt the Model Police Act, but with modifications as required. The Act is being prepared by an expert committee headed by Soli Sorabjee.
At the same time, about half-a-dozen states, mostly from south India, spoke in favour of the police reforms though they too were apprehensive about certain clauses. Almost all the states opposed inclusion of a provision whereby a policeman can be jailed for three months for non-registration of a case.
Meanwhile, the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have not even made an oral submission, nor did they send their affidavits. Jamu and Kashmir, Tripura, Uttaranchal, Chattisgarh, Delhi and Chandigarh too chose to ignore the matter.
OTHER SUGGESTIONS
The police system should revert back to IGP system and the post of D.G. Police should be abolished. The number of posts of DIGs should be increased and more powers given to them. At the same time, the rank of IGP should be elevated to the Lt. General of the Army and the DIG should wear ranks equal to the Major General of the Army, while the district superintendents of Police should wear the Brigadiers rank of the Indian Army. The district superintendents of police should have separate superintendents for law and order and separate for investigation of crime. Traffic police should also be under the district superintendent of police.
The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) has been active in campaigning for police reforms in India and has organized many discussions across the country. CHRI held a one-day 'national consultation' in New Delhi to consider 'what must go into creating the police that we want for our country.' A large number of police officers from across the country were in attendance, though, sadly enough, one did not notice any established human rights activist, man or woman in this meeting.
The role of the IAS and IPS, the massive growth of centralized paramilitary forces, the role of police intelligence agencies involved in the management of public order, federalism and the decentralization of police and the participation of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in local law and order management and so on. The police in the USA are highly decentralized and autonomous with over 17000 police forces in action! Can we learn something from this experience?
There is need and scope for a fuller and deeper discussion by concerned citizens, scholars and activists, men and women. This discussion, however, must be organized by an independent, non-partisan agency. An agency not tied to the apron springs of the government in any way but is willing to engage it in a creative dialogue.
Conclusion
THE criminal negligence by the UP Police in Noida’s Nithari village has once again highlighted the urgent need for police reforms, which cannot be ignored either by the Union or the State governments. The strategy of the State governments and political parties should therefore be of circumspection, with contestation with the Centre positively directed on objectives and details rather than on its leadership role. The Supreme Court directive indeed has some gaping holes on administrative principles, which deserve to be countered with persuasive arguments of a detailed plan of action. Organisational autonomy of the police and the question of political control, for example, are matters that deserve serious discussion. Police reforms are imperative for a stable internal security environment which must not be lost due to political bickering which will leave no winners.
The existing police systems in India is a legacy of colonial rule that have been shaped by post-colonial histories. The consequences of poor policing include brutality and torture, extra-judicial executions, a lack of due process, impunity, corruption, bias and discrimination and public fear, anger and resentment
Those who have visited a police station any time can tell the tales of horror and disgust. It is a truth that a majority of law-abiding Indians would like to avoid stepping into a police station. Nor would they like to be visited by a policeman in public view. It is unfortunate that this is so even five decades after we became free from alien rule.
In year 2006, the mystery of missing children, unravelled in Uttar Pradesh’s industrial-residential suburb to Delhi, Noida, underlined some known facts about the police. First, the police in India are inefficient, irresponsible, insensitive and corrupt and the maladies now affect not only the cutting edge level, for long touted as the problematic core of the organisation, but it has spread across the organisational ladder to the top, despite some shining examples of excellence and probity. Second, the need for organisational and systemic reforms for this crucial institution of governance, urgent for decades, has now become emergent. Third, the political class running the machinery of the Indian state at different levels is least interested in police reforms for known and obvious reasons.
Besides,the police across the country has been known to avoid registering cases in order to keep the crime rate and work load low for decades; it is the poor who invariably bear the brunt of their inefficiency, corruption and brutality. The registration of the First Information Report (FIR), the initial complaint by affected persons before the police take cognizance of an unlawful incident or crime, has for long been used by the police as an instrument to extort money from and harass the complainants. It is, therefore, not surprising that the police turned away the poor complaining about their missing children from the police station with characteristic disdain. Starkly, a high-profile kidnapping in the posh Sector 15A of Noida in 2006 witnessed an unprecedented police (and the media) mobilisation, while the series of disappearance of children during the past two years in the impoverished part of this urban village drew apathy, scorn (for the poor victim families) and negligence from the police. Considering that Noida is a district town with seats of the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police not very far away from the scene of the occurrence, the incident also clearly brings out the complete absence for the citizens of channels of appeal to the senior officers in cases of negligence and dereliction of duty at the lower levels. Clearly, the class bias of the police, nay the entire administrative structure, always there, has been perpetuated over the decades and has become a systemic feature even as Indian democracy matures.
apart from it,the pervasiveness of dereliction of the basic duty by the police has recently been revealed also during the trials of Priyadarshini Mattoo and Jessica Lal cases in the nation’s Capital. In both the cases the Delhi High Court passed heavy strictures against the Delhi Police. The police was found deficient in taking cognisance of and investigating both the cases. In fact, the involvement of a senior police officer’s son in the former prompted the police to not only ignore the complaint of the victim, but also to resort to shoddy investigation, which in any case has become the soft underbelly of policing in India. The organisational rot is visible also from the rising cases of recorded custodial crime—death as well as rape—by the police. It has risen by 50 per cent in the country between 2004 and 2005. Abdul Karim Telgi’s stamp scam cast its shadow even over the hallowed chair of the Mumbai Police Commissioner. Inspector General rank police officers are facing trial in heinous crimes like murder. Obviously, the Indian Police Service, one of the two prestigious all-India services, has lost its sheen both in probity and efficiency. The pressure of and unpreparedness for facing challenges like terrorism and armed crime in a systematic and organised fashion has led to encounter deaths. The most glaring result of such a pressure was visible in Delhi nearly a decade ago when an innocent person was shot dead after a chase in the busy commercial hub, Connaught Place. Obviously, the pervasively deep rot necessitates comprehensive reforms at every level, incorporating every aspect of policing, though the delivery level deserves urgent and immediate attention.
Thus Police reforms are the crying need of the time which aims to realise increased demand for and achievement of police accountability and reform throughout the country.There is near unanimity among a cross-section of our opinion leaders, be they politicians, administrators, academics or members of the press, that there is something rotten with the system, and that the police will have to change radically in order to become people-friendly. The specific charges hurled by the common man are that the police are corrupt, brutal and insensitive to the poor. Perhaps the most damaging accusation is that the police are biased in favour of the majority community and do not protect the minorities when there is religious tension. The reports of a number of inquiry commissions will bear this out. We are aware of what happened in Gujarat and how the police there have been squarely charged with looking the other way when fundamentalists were indulging in savage behaviour. Against this backdrop, there is a widespread feeling that all the ills of the police are due to the acute politicisation of the system, and that no reform exercise will ever succeed till politicians agree not to interfere with the day-to-day operations of the police. Autonomy for the police without loss of accountability is the slogan that is raised in chorus by a chunk of the pro-reform lobby.
EARLIER EFFORTS FOR REFORMING POLICING IN INDIA
SEVERAL aspects of the police administration— organisational structure, work culture, training, politicisation, accountability structures, magisterial control, corruption, brutality, etc.— have been discussed and reviewed in order to bring about reforms since independence. Interestingly the government of United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh after independence) appointed a Police Reorganisation Committee on January 23, 1947, which reviewed the ills plaguing the police organisation, like corruption, misuse of authority, brutality and so on, and also discussed the reasons behind ills like non-registration of First Information Report (FIR), poor investigation, fabrication of evidence etc.
While recommending some organisational rearrangements, the Committee laid great emphasis on recruitment policy, better salary and service conditions, training ,professionalisation and specialisation of the personnel and various units of the police, inculcation of scientific methods of investigation and creation of a special unit for it.
However, the discourse on police reform began after independence at the State level in the 1960s, when several States appointed Police Commi-ssions to look at police reforms within the framework of the 1861 Police Act. The Union Government obviously adopted a textbook constitutional position by leaving this matter of the List II of the Seventh Schedule (state list) entirely to the States, though given the political atmosphere of the time and the prevailing ‘Congress system’, to use Rajni Kothari’s famous formulation on India’s one-party dominant system, it was possible for the Union Government to undertake a leader’s role in guiding and coordinating police reforms. For, the Centre alone could have contemplated replacing the Indian Police Act 1861 that designed and founded the present police ‘force’ in the aftermath of the events of 1857 with one drawn in accordance with the new republican Constitution enacted in 1950. Anyway, the State governments appear to have been governed by their own political imperatives to set up Police Commissions and accordingly defined their terms of reference. Thus, throughout the 1960s and 1970s one State after the other reviewed its police system (some did it even more than once), but none of the States authorised its Commission to question the Act of 1861 in any way. Naturally, solutions were suggested within the existing framework. The recommendations of these Commissions were mainly concerned with details of the administrative set up, the strength of the police force in different wings of the system, pay and allowances of the police in different ranks, qualifications for recruitment to various ranks, the set-up for training centres, curricula for training and the like.
However, the Union Government too felt the need to review the functioning of the police in the context of the administrative reforms. Hence, without meddling with the State realm, the Centre reviewed administrative structures and training in the 1970s, but the recommendations remained on paper. The Dharam Vira headed National Police Commission in 1977 came after three decades of inaction to reform this vital institution of governance and its growing decadence under political patronage. Its appointment however, was under the shadow of the misuse of the police machinery and the police behaviour during the Emergency imposed by Mrs Gandhi. In severe indictment of the police the Shah Commission of Inquiry appointed to look into excesses committed during the Emergency said:
"The police was used and allowed themselves to be used for purposes, some of which were, to say the least, questionable. Some police officers behaved as if they were not accountable at all to any public authority. The decision to arrest and release certain persons were entirely on political considerations, which were intended to be favourable to the ruling party. Employing the police to the advantage of any political party is a sure source of subverting the rule of law. The government must seriously consider the feasibility and desirability of insulating the police from the politics of the country and employing it scrupulously on duties for which alone it is by law intended."
Obviously, despite a stupendous task accomplished by the NPC, the shadow of the Emergency and the observations against the police and the Indira Gandhi regime during the Emergency was likely to fall on its recommendations. The defeat and fragmentation of the Janata Party regime and return of Mrs Indira Gandhi in 1980, when the report of the Commission was eventually presented, created a negative political atmosphere for the NPC report, making the new regime look at the report with politically coloured glasses.
If we ask for a status report on the NPC reports, we will get impressive but deceptive statistics. You will be told that more than 90 per cent of the NPC recommendations have been implemented. What you will not be told is that three of the most crucial ones are yet to see the light of day. The first of these relates to the setting up of a State Security Commission that will not only evaluate the performance of the police but also entertain representations from officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above against being subjected to illegal or irregular orders. Such a Commission - headed by the Minister in charge of the police and in which one of the six members will be from the Opposition in the legislature - could greatly reduce the frequency of wrongful and unethical directions to officers, either by the police leadership or by the political executive. The second is choosing the Director-General of Police of a State through a clinical process and conferring on him a mandatory tenure of four years. Finally, the NPC recommended the replacement of the Police Act, 1861, with a new Act that takes care of the current times when we need a swift-acting police that is not hampered by an obstructive Executive Magistrate, especially during major law and order situations. The NPC actually went to the extent of drafting a model Police Act, which plugged several lacunae in the old Act and submitted it for government acceptance. The mandarins in North Block have been dragging their feet over this since 1981, obviously because the new Act makes the police mostly free from the Executive Magistrate and the political executive. While the first two recommendations need action by State Chief Ministers, in respect of the third, both Parliament and the State legislatures are competent to bring forward a Bill that could become the new Police Act applicable to the whole country.
Yet, despite being jettisoned, the NPC report has led the urge and quest for police reforms amidst strong political, bureaucratic and internal resistance. It indeed set an agenda for all the future discourses on police reforms.
The successive committees—Rebeiro (1998), Padmanabhaiah (2000), Malimath (2000), which situated the police reforms in the Criminal Justice System framework and Soli Sorabji (2005), appointed to draft a new Police Act—have used the NPC report and recommendations therein as the reference point. The Rebeiro, Padmanabhaiah Committees were appointed to honour the directive of the Supreme Court of India to the Government of India in response to the petition for police reforms by Prakash Singh to identify action points for the implementation of the recommendations of the NPC. The Rebeiro Committee laid great emphasis on introducing institutional and scientific approaches to streamline the affairs in police departments across the country. It did not claim to make a major departure from the NPC recommendations, for many of its suggestions referred to the NPC report for a detailed reference; it updated the report keeping in view nearly two decades of developments since the NPC made its recommendations. This committee too followed the institutional approach of the NPC and the Rebeiro Committee. There were minor variations such as the two-year minimum term for a State Police chief as compared to three years preferred by the Rebeiro Committee and so on. Some of its recommendations, such as recruitment of more Sub-Inspectors than constables, without a comprehensive view of the entire organisational structure, were debatable, to say the least. However, the Committee did emphasise the fact that without a comprehensive criminal justice reforms, no police reforms would be meaningful.
Not surprisingly, almost around the time that the Padmanabhaiah Committee was appointed, the Malimath Committee for the review and reform of the Criminal Justice System was also appointed. The Malimath Committee addressed the principles of the Criminal Justice System, investigation, prosecution, judiciary, crime and punishment and made 158 observations and recommendations. There are 55 major recommendations of which 42 have to be implemented by the Union Government and 26 by the State governments. The report has been heavily criticised by human rights organisation and legal experts for its suggestion of changing the burden of proof.
Though the numerous recommendations of various police reforms commissions are not a panacea for all the ills of the police. Police leaders, present and past have no doubt failed to bring about an ambience in which the executive could have been convinced of the need for reforms. The gulf of a lack of trust between the two remains unbridged. But this is no argument for stalling reforms. The silent majority in the country needs the reforms badly.
THE DIRECTIVES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
It is a matter of coincidence that when the Soli Sorabji Committee has been at work to draft a new Police Act, the Apex Court judgment compelled the Union Government to speak to the States for implementing the guidelines for police reforms.
The Supreme Court has acted on the petition of Prakash Singh, former DGP and directed the Centre and all states to implement police reforms that have been in the cold storage for almost 25 years now when the National Police Commission recommended reforms for the police force between 1977 and 1981.
The Supreme Court judgment of September 22, 2006, has sparked a national debate on police reforms aimed at removing any scope of political or other extraneous interference and influence in discharging its functions.
In directing the Government of India to bring about police reforms within a time frame, the Apex Court has taken into account the suggestions made by the Sorabji Committee too. Based on the exercises carried on by various committees, it made a seven-fold recommen-dation aimed at ensuring accountability, responsiveness and loosening of political control in order to spur depoliticisation of the police organisation as follows:
First, appointment of a State Security Commission ‘to ensure that the State Government does not exercise unwarranted influence or pressure on the State Police and for laying down the broad policy guidelines so that the State Police always acts according to the laws of the land and the Constitution of the country’.
Second, it recommended selection of the Director General of Police of the State from amongst the three seniormost officers of the Department who have been empanelled for promotion to that rank by the Union Public Service Commission on the basis of their length of service, very good record and range of experience for heading the police force with a minimum tenure of at least two years irrespective of his date of superannuating. The State Government can take disciplinary action, if required, acting in consultation with the State Security Commission and under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules.
Third, the Apex Court also recommended a fixed tenure of two years for police officers on operational duties in the field like the Inspector General of Police in-charge of a Zone, Deputy Inspector General of Police in-charge of a Range, Superintendent of Police in-charge of a district, and Station House Officer in-charge of a Police Station unless it was found necessary to remove them prematurely following disciplinary proceedings against them or their conviction in a criminal offence or in a case of corruption or if the incumbent is otherwise incapacitated from discharging his responsibilities.
Fourth, the Court recommended phased separation of the investigating police from the law and order police to ensure speedier investigation, better expertise and improved rapport with the people, but with full coordination between the two wings.
Fifth, establishment of a Police Establishment Board, a departmental body comprising the Director General of Police and four other senior officers of the Department, in each State was recommended to decide on all transfers, postings, promotions and other service related mattes of officers of and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Apart from making appropriate recommendations to the State Government regarding the posting and transfers of officers of and above the rank of Superintendent of Police, which the government would be expected to give due weight to, it would also function as a forum of appeal for disposing of representations from officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above regarding their promotion/ transfer/ disciplinary proceedings or their being subjected to illegal or irregular orders and generally reviewing the functioning of the police in the State.
The sixth recommendation was to constitute a Police Complaints Authority each at the district level, to look into complaints against police officers of and up to the rank of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, and at the State level, to look into complaints against officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above. Even the composition of these bodies has been suggested by the Apex Court in its directives.
Finally a National Security Commission at the Union level, headed by the Union Home Minister and comprising heads of the Central Police Organisations (CPOs) and a couple of security experts as members with the Union Home Secretary as its Secretary, was suggested to prepare a panel for being placed before the appropriate Appointing Authority, for selection and placement of Chiefs of the CPOs, who should also be given a minimum tenure of two years and for reviewing the service conditions of the CPO personnel.
These are long over-due measures. The requirement contained in the judgment that the SCB's report should be placed before the State legislature is highly salutary, and will enable the elected representatives to play an effective role as the people's watchdogs. The Government should accept the recommendations of the PEB as final without any further meddling. To strengthen the hands of the PCA, it should be empowered to launch disciplinary proceedings and criminal cases straightaway without having to refer its findings to Government for further action. The stipulations for providing for a minimum tenure of service for the DGP and other top officials in the police hierarchy and for separating the law and order responsibilities from crime investigation are also unexceptionable.
Despite general agreement on the urgency for police reform, the opinion has been divided on the directive given by the Supreme Court. Some experts have raised objection to the multi-level accountability structure, which might not make the police so much efficient and apolitical, as tied up in too many knots for functional autonomy. Would it be possible to find so many apolitical and non-partisan persons at different levels? Would it not create another set of interests that would like to be benefited from the proximity with the police? Would the politicians not find ways of getting around such persons by providing them with certain sets of benefits? There has been an agreement for a fixed tenure for the State Police chief for some time. However, a fixed tenure at each level, particularly at the thana level, could be questioned from the perspective of principles of public administration. These are only some of the questions being asked on the directive of the Supreme Court which appears to have been taken in by its crusade against decades of role abdication by the executive in several fields due to political considerations.
SAFEGUARDS AND CONTROLS
However, freeing the police from political interference and manipulation should be subject to appropriate safeguards and controls. Otherwise, any uniformed service, apt to be on a short fuse, can become an engine of oppression. Some of the suggested steps to inculcate the needed degree of accountability and spirit of public service are given below:
The practice of the annual performance evaluation reports on the SPs/DSPs being written by Collectors and on the DGP/IGP/DIGs by the Chief Secretary should be revived.
Taking stringent action on strictures by Courts on deficiencies and omissions in investigation and conduct of cases should be made the special responsibility of the Chief Secretary who should send his report to the SCB.
Other than the PCA, there should be a separate high-power Authority to deal specially with brutalities, use of excessive force, custodial deaths and other misuse of authority by the police.
Departmental proceedings and criminal cases involving the police should be akin to court martial procedures, completed within the shortest possible time of, say, four to six months.
Civil society organisations and individuals should be free to organise meetings, demonstrations and the like in public places after informing the police (to avoid duplication, possibility of clashes and the like), without any need to take prior permission.
A special squad should be constituted for dealing with offences pertaining to social ills (dowry, marriage disputes, untouchability, public nuisance and so on) taking them out of the purview of regular police
WHAT ELSE NEEDS TO BE DONE ?
The first ever National Police Commission (NPC) in independent India (1979-81) went into the role of the constabulary in its very first volume. Its recommendations are yet to receive official attention.Nearly 90 per cent of the police forces in the country is comprised of the constabulary. Unlike in the past, more and more educated men and women are voluntarily joining the police at this entry level, in expectation of a satisfying career. This precious resource will have to be protected. This is not possible under the existing state of affairs, where obedience and servility to the senior officers and the political masters are the main criteria for advancement and placement in meaningful jobs within the police. If professional excellence has to be nurtured, even at the level of the much-maligned constabulary, we owe them the right working conditions in which they can give of their best. Such an ambience cannot come about without implementing the most crucial NPC recommendations that are gathering dust in North Block and in State Secretariats. Meanwhile, we have had a report on the subject, prepared by Julio Ribeiro, that has been submitted by the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Supreme Court, which is looking into a public interest petition demanding implementation of the NPC recommendations.
Besides,Police leaders will have to make criminal investigation more science-aided so as to bring down the incidence of third degree methods during interrogations. DNA testing is the new tool that has revolutionised crime investigation in most parts of the West. While such testing is a costly proposition, funds should not stand in the way of expanding the facility available for this. We have only a few laboratories in the country undertaking this work. In the area of communication, the ambitious project of linking all police stations through the Polnet is still to be implemented in full. Like these, there are several other projects that can transform policing and render it a really state-of-the art professional service.
What we now need is a vision and a new level of dedication to the task of upgrading police skills and morale. A brainstorming session chaired by the president of India, in the presence of the Home Minister and past and present police leaders, should help generate ideas that could impart new dimensions to police reforms. This is the best thing that can happen to the Indian Police.
The police is a neglected area where the stranglehold of past practices and the executive's unconcealed desire to use it against political opponents stifle the germination of new ideas. The stock of the police is so low that new experiments can only improve its image and not cause any further damage. A strong political will power to implement police reforms will be hailed by all sections of society if it can, even marginally, make the police more people friendly.
OBSTACLES
MANY of the States predictably objected to the Apex Court directive. The States felt that it was too simplistic to blame political interference for decline in working of the police. They appeared opposed to any move, like the role of the UPSC in the selection of the DGs, that would undermine their authority and bring in the influence of the Union Government. They were also against fixed tenures for the police officers on operational duties like the SHO, which they felt would create ‘monsters’ in police stations. They also claimed to have accountability structures and fresh ones would add to the cost. Some non-Congress Chief Ministers even accused the Union Home Minister of playing politics with police reforms.
This has created a situation of contest and confrontation on the issue of police reforms, with the hardening of attitudes of the Apex Court and of the State governments. India’s federalised polity has weakened Central initiatives in national politics and policy arenas and, therefore, it also creates contestation between the Union Government and some of the States on this crucial issue. While the State governments could have a valid point or two on the recommendations made by the Supreme Court, it is imperative that they need to be circumspect on their objections. This situation has come because once the State initiatives failed by mid-1970s, the main discourse on police reforms has been located on the turf of the Union Government. The Supreme Court too did not find it anomalous to direct the Union Government, rather than the State governments, to implement police reforms, though it did stress that the recommendations were binding on the State governments too.
Therefore, the resistance of some of the Chief Ministers during their meeting with the Union Home Minister on January 2, 2007 on federal grounds is constitutionally and politically untenable. The States were given the initiative to initiate police reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, but the exercise remained fruitless or mechanical exercises despite some of the State Police Commissions giving useful recommendations from social and political perspectives, limitations imposed by the 1861 Act notwithstanding, which they could not alter. Though some of the States appointed two Commissions between the 1960s and 1980s, most of them ignored a large part of the recommendations by their respective Commissions. Moreover, the NPC as well as all the post-1998 initiatives were taken by non-Congress governments and most of the leaders and parties, objecting to the Apex Court directed UPA initiative, have been part of it. Given the urgent need for it, they all need to put police reforms above their political compulsions and come to a national political consensus on the nature of police reforms.
A careful look at the Constitution of India suggests that entries 1 and 2 of List II read with Entry 2A of List I (Union List) in the Seventh Schedule do not preclude the role of the Union Government in internal security, of which the police is just an instrument. Entry 2A was inserted by the controversial 42nd Amendment by Mrs Indira Gandhi during the Emergency, but it was not undone by the 44th Amendment authored by the Janata Government. Indeed, the argument that the Centre must not interfere with the day-to-day maintenance of law and order is unexceptionable. But the need for a new Police Act and the place of the police in the larger criminal justice system creates a leader’s role for the Union Government in this exercise, which must be accepted by all the States, beyond partisanship. Indeed, it is equally unexceptionable that the Union Government too needs to look at its leadership role in a coordination mode.
The Supreme Court’s directives on police reforms has met with serious opposition. Several states, including Gujarat, Bihar, West Bengal, Maharashtra and those from the North-East, have said that they may move the apex court before its December 31 deadline for implementation.
The argument is that since police is a state subject, the Supreme Court has no locus standi to give directions. The states in their individual representations in a meeting of Chief Secretaries and DGPs of states and Union Territories chaired by Union Home Secretary said that the states are against division of policing into law and order on one side and investigations on the other.
While Meghalaya and Mizoram sad that their districts are widely scattered and thus it is not possible to divide their police team, the states of Gujarat and Bihar were critical of the suggestion to hand over the selection of a DGP to a panel. The states also read from the affidavits they had submitted before the Supreme Court and hinted that they may go for revision, according to reports. .
However, Union Home Secretary made it clear that the states have to adopt the Model Police Act, but with modifications as required. The Act is being prepared by an expert committee headed by Soli Sorabjee.
At the same time, about half-a-dozen states, mostly from south India, spoke in favour of the police reforms though they too were apprehensive about certain clauses. Almost all the states opposed inclusion of a provision whereby a policeman can be jailed for three months for non-registration of a case.
Meanwhile, the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have not even made an oral submission, nor did they send their affidavits. Jamu and Kashmir, Tripura, Uttaranchal, Chattisgarh, Delhi and Chandigarh too chose to ignore the matter.
OTHER SUGGESTIONS
The police system should revert back to IGP system and the post of D.G. Police should be abolished. The number of posts of DIGs should be increased and more powers given to them. At the same time, the rank of IGP should be elevated to the Lt. General of the Army and the DIG should wear ranks equal to the Major General of the Army, while the district superintendents of Police should wear the Brigadiers rank of the Indian Army. The district superintendents of police should have separate superintendents for law and order and separate for investigation of crime. Traffic police should also be under the district superintendent of police.
The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) has been active in campaigning for police reforms in India and has organized many discussions across the country. CHRI held a one-day 'national consultation' in New Delhi to consider 'what must go into creating the police that we want for our country.' A large number of police officers from across the country were in attendance, though, sadly enough, one did not notice any established human rights activist, man or woman in this meeting.
The role of the IAS and IPS, the massive growth of centralized paramilitary forces, the role of police intelligence agencies involved in the management of public order, federalism and the decentralization of police and the participation of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in local law and order management and so on. The police in the USA are highly decentralized and autonomous with over 17000 police forces in action! Can we learn something from this experience?
There is need and scope for a fuller and deeper discussion by concerned citizens, scholars and activists, men and women. This discussion, however, must be organized by an independent, non-partisan agency. An agency not tied to the apron springs of the government in any way but is willing to engage it in a creative dialogue.
Conclusion
THE criminal negligence by the UP Police in Noida’s Nithari village has once again highlighted the urgent need for police reforms, which cannot be ignored either by the Union or the State governments. The strategy of the State governments and political parties should therefore be of circumspection, with contestation with the Centre positively directed on objectives and details rather than on its leadership role. The Supreme Court directive indeed has some gaping holes on administrative principles, which deserve to be countered with persuasive arguments of a detailed plan of action. Organisational autonomy of the police and the question of political control, for example, are matters that deserve serious discussion. Police reforms are imperative for a stable internal security environment which must not be lost due to political bickering which will leave no winners.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)