INDIA’S MAOIST DILEMMA

NOTE AND WARNING: This essay has been submitted to an Essay Competition conducted by Indian Army. I have published it on this blog to help the civil services aspirant going to be appear in this year's CSE-2008. The exact reproduction and use of this Essay for any other purposes will attract penalty.
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At a meeting of chief ministers and senior officials in April 2006, the prime minister described the Maoist violence as India’s greatest internal security threat. It was a grudging admission that the State had failed to contain an armed insurrection which has infected around 165 of India’s 602 districts. This is indeed a serious issue ought to be considered immediately.

The recent surge in Naxalite violence once again confirms that it is more than a mere law and order problem. There is also an increasing evidence of their extra-national links with forces hostile to the interests of this country. This calls for a renewed thrust in coping with the issue. Even, Army intelligence points to a close connection between the Maoists and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).
Maoism etymologically means the thoughts and teachings of Mao Ze dong, who was Chinese leader. His thought is a variant of Marxism which was prevalent in the Communist Party of china till Chinese economic reforms in 1978. It aims at creation of a socialist society through socialist military construction and also provides guidelines for a socialist revolution for the same. Today Maoist organizations exists in numerous countries of the world like Peru, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan etc. and engaged in continuous armed battle with the respective Governments . They are against the imperialist influence in their countries. In India Maoism emerged in the form of Naxalism.
Naxalite or Naxalism is an informal name given to communist groups. Ideologically they belong to various trends of Maoism. Initially the movement had its centre in West Bengal . In recent years, they have spread into less developed areas of rural central and eastern India, such as Chattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh through the activities of underground groups like the Communist Party of India (Maoist).
This term originally comes from Naxalbari, a small village in West Bengal, where a section of Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) led by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal led a violent uprising in 1967, trying to develop a "revolutionary opposition" in opposition to the CPI(M) leadership. The insurrection started on May 25, 1967 in Naxalbari village when a peasant was attacked by hired hands over a land dispute. Local peasants retaliated by attacking the local landlords and the violence escalated.Majumdar greatly admired Mao Zedong of China and advocated that Indian peasants and lower classes must follow in his footsteps and overthrow the government and upper classes whom he held responsible for their plight. He engendered the Naxalite movement through his writings, the most famous being the 'Historic Eight Documents' which formed the basis of Naxalite ideology . In 1967 Naxalites' organized the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries(AICCCR), and later broke away from CPI(M). Uprisings were organized in several parts of the country. In 1969 AICCCR gave birth to Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).
Practically all Naxalite groups trace their origin to the CPI(ML). A separate tendency from the beginning was the Maoist Communist Centre, which evolved out of the Dakshin Desh-group. MCC later fused with People's War Group to form Communist Party of India (Maoist). Another tendency is that of the Andhra revolutionary communists, which was mainly presented by UCCRI(ML), following the mass line legacy of T. Nagi Reddy. That tendency broke with AICCCR at an early stage.
During the 1970s the movement was fragmented into several disputing factions. By 1980 it was estimated that around 30 Naxalite groups were active, with a combined membership of 30 000. More recent figures put the strength of the movement at 15,000, and claim the guerrillas control an estimated one fifth of India's forests.
The reasons behind this stealthy spread of Maoist practice and intent entrenched are the social inequality and the State’s abdication of responsibility. While India’s policy-makers gloat over the economy that will rank third in the world in a few decades, the National Sample Survey Organization estimates put a third of India’s rural population as living on less than Rs 12 a day. Apathy breeds anger and, then, violence. The rebellion survives and spreads by feeding on the anger of the deprived. The newly acquired prosperity of the landlords, bourgeois traders and bureaucrats further annoys and frustrates them. They believe that the benefits of the Panchayati Raj have been cornered by a handful of well-do-peasants. Hence, they have declared all landlords, big or small, and all bourgeois, powerful or petty, as class enemies and have been working for their elimination through violent means. Now,Maoist violence has spread from 156 districts in 13 states in September 2004 to 170 districts in 15 states in February 2005, affecting about 40 per cent of the geographical area of the country and 35 per cent of its population, going by intelligence reports. With the objective of establishing a “Compact Revolutionary Zone” as typified by the Red Corridor, extending from North Bihar to the underdeveloped hinterland of Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka and West Bengal, the Naxalites want to use this stretch for eventual seizure of the state power. Whether it is the activism of Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh, the attack on Jehanabad jail (resulting in freeing of about 340 prisoners and their leader Ajay Kanu) in Bihar, the killing of Sunil Mahato, the JMM MP or the attack on a police camp in Bastar killing about 56 policemen, the extremists have demonstrated greater precision, penetration, organization and audacity in striking their chosen targets at will.
They are now trying to transform themselves into a modern guerrilla force, equipped with sophisticated weapons and communication system. With the formation of a united outfit namely CPI(Maoist) along with the raising of an armed wing called the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army through the merger of Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the People’s War Group (PWG), the movement has been able to resolve infighting. There has also been a shift in focus and strategy. Today, they are not only logistically better organized and better trained; they are also better motivated and better led.
The new strategy adopted by them is one of protracted armed struggle whose objective is not seizure of land, crops or other immediate targets, but the seizure of state power. Within this perspective, participation in elections and engagements with the prevailing bourgeois democracy are rejected, and all efforts are focused on revolutionary activities to undermine the state and seize power. They plan to mount further attacks against the symbols of “feudalism, imperialism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism’ and they don’t mind supporting the struggle of nationalities for their self-determination, including the right to secession. They are believed to be working on a counter-strategy to intensify the people’s war by increasing their mass base across the country and strengthening its armed cadres. If we try to examine the pattern, breadth and precision of extremist violence in the country, we will notice that they have not only been successful in strengthening the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the military wing of the CPI-Maoist, but have also succeeded in recruiting more cadres. They have done this through militant, but populist mass movements against the neo-liberal policies of globalization, liberalization, and privatization. Their strategies are aimed at expanding the armed struggle from “guerrilla war” to “urban and mobile warfare”, focusing on industrial areas. With Singur and Nandigram coming into focus, the extremists are placing more emphasis on an agrarian revolution and a protracted people’s war as the path towards a “new democratic revolution”, as witnessed during the heyday of the Naxalbari upsurge in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Naxalites have cashed in on the popular resistance to the proposed land acquisitions in Singur and Nandigram, if reports of their expanding mass base in such areas are any indication. They further plan to use resistance to the SEZ phenomenon as a means to extend their presence to new areas. Today, as many as 250 proposals to establish SEZs in 21 states are awaiting approval and Naxalites are reportedly busy drawing up plans for more such flare-ups. Taking a cue from their Nepalese counterparts, the home-grown Maoists are believed to be in collusion with sundry revisionist and secessionist forces in order to expand their support base. The Maoists in Nepal had declared their support to eight minority autonomous regions during their armed struggle. In return, they received support from these areas. Naxalites here have also been supporting demands for separate states like Telengana and Vidarbha. They also support the secessionist movements in the North-east and Kashmir and as such pose a bigger threat to national security than we have cared to believe so far.

India is hurting. Its people are being terrorized and killed. And the Government is in a quandary to find a solution to quell the wave of violence and bloodshed unleashed across its Eastern and Central villages by the Maoist Communist rebels, commonly known as Naxalites. Indian establishment is on the cross road to handle this problem.
While Nepal has witnessed reconciliation with the Maoists, as reflected in the latter’s participation in the new government, India continues to be a victim of their violence. With the extremists joining the mainstream, the movement ought to end in Nepal. India is still groping in trying to assess the problem and formulate a strategy. Therefore a synergized strategy is imperative for our country to come out from a dilemma about tackling this growing menace. The Bhubaneswar meeting of the National Naxalite Coordination Committee was a step in this direction
Primarily, India’s maoist dilemma is all about the adoption of an appropriate strategy to tackle this growing menace. Indian leadership seems to be confused to take a particular stand among the following :
[1] Development and law and order strategy
[2] Onetime crackdown with heavy hand
[3] Creation of conducive conditions to assimilate these sons and daughters in to main stream.
The second strategy will never give a permanent solution to this age old problem because of the local support enjoyed by Maoist. This has clearly been demonstrated by the failure of “Salawa judum” experiment in Chattisgarh.It happened despite the fact that tribals have taken the lead in this experiment.
Thus we have to search other options. Initial measures implemented by the Government have proven to be inadequate in uprooting the Naxalite extremist faction propagating the rebellion. Its attempts have caused the Naxalites to retaliate with increased aggression on vulnerable villages. We can obtain pointers from the late peace leader Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. In spite of India's complicated diversity of peoples and languages, Gandhi had given it a new ideal and had presented to the world a new ideal of India. Non-violence became an ingrain source of Hindu action. The bare-footed Mahatma Gandhi, had reached into the heart of a convoluted and incongruent country, and roused its vast population to win the greatest victory modern India has ever witnessed with his new message: "Satya, Satyagraha, and Ahimsa" (Truth, Resistance in the Cause of Truth and Nonviolence). Under his tutelage, the nation of India embraced peace in the height of great turmoil and British repression. He single handedly led India to Independence. Had he lived he would be ashamed to see beggars forgetting their Hindu customs and leading armed revolt against their leaders and kinfolks.
The central government along with the state governments has to formulate a comprehensive strategy to speed up the development process. It must start from land reforms. This development strategy should cover wholistic develomental requirements of the pople i.e. social,economic and political. It is the duty of the state to ensure equitable distribution of the benifts.
Apart from it ,government must also ensure that all its agencies work in a just and transparent manner. Justice should be delivered without any further delay.Corruption should be weed out from the governent secor. It should be ensured that state apartus is not being utilised to exploit weaker sections.
When this happens, the supply chain of the maoist will be disturbed. When people will get the justice from the state,education from government schools,health from governemnt hospitals and adequate employement near to their homes, they will definitely think twice before joining Maoist movement.
But,this requires a strong political will to provide legal framework to expedite the process.Maoist should be properly persuaded to join mainstream. For this,government must have a proper and attractive rehabilitation packege. The vocational training can also be provided for gainful employment.
In other words, the memorandum of Peace between government and Maoist should include:
[1] Dialogue between Government and the extremist leaders to discuss grievances and methods to alleviate such.
[2] Government's denouncement of the violence perpetrated by the Naxalite rebels in the village attacks.
[3] An Order for Naxalites to cease its attack immediately.
[4] Punishment for those violating the order.
[5] A strengthening of armed police presence in Naxalite targeted villages.
[6] A reform of policies to provide more jobs for the jobless.
[7]Policy to help alleviate poverty in the targeted villages.
[8] An open door policy between local government and villagers terrorized by the Naxalites.
[9] A Justice System more sensitive to the oppressed.
[10] Policy for economic development in outlying villages.
[11] An Education policy incorporating deprived children in the outlying villages.
However,along with this political approach,law and order machinery is also need complete overhauling.Unfortunately, the state governments are shockingly ill-equipped to fight the Maoists. The police know precious little about the terrorist outfit and its leaders, how it functions, its goals and its tactics. There is no clear strategy to tackle and defeat the Maoists. This is outrageous, considering the fact that the Maoists have been around for many years now and have been gaining in strength steadily. The growth of the Maoists would surely have been detected by an efficient and strong intelligence radar. It is high time the states and central intelligence agencies, and the state police's own intelligence-gathering machinery, are revamped and infused with not only fresh blood, but meritorious officers and personnel are posted there and allowed a free hand to do their job. At the same time, a special force such as Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh to hunt down and exterminate these terrorists needs to be raised immediately and this force be trained in jungle and urban combat.
The state cannot afford to be soft in tackling terrorism. Yes, the root cause of terrorism--and in this case, it is excruciating poverty caused by abject state neglect of the tribal and rural areas and endemic corruption that causes colossal leakage of developmental funds meant for these areas--must be tackled. But we've seen in the past that Maoists have stalled developmental projects since they know that these projects, aimed at benefiting the poor, would lead to loss of their influence and stranglehold on the poor and the tribal. They want the status quo to continue because they can grow only if the poor and the tribal continue to live in poverty and neglect, without access to healthcare, education and other amenities But this should not deter the state machinery from pushing development projects like roads, schools, healthcare facilities and schemes for providing work, housing etc very aggressively in the affected areas. At the same time, a fierce effort should be launched to wipe away the Maoists. And then, a determined endeavor should start to ensure that the ugly blot of Maoism does not stain impressionable minds. Getting back to the war on Maoists, it ought to be realised that there's no alternative to hunting the Maoists down and annihilating them. That's the only way terrorism can be, and has been, tackled. All such outfits which were defeated across the world--the Baader-Meinhof in Germany, the Red Army in Japan, Italy's Red Brigade, Punjab's Khalistanis and even the Naxals in Bengal--had to be put down with a heavy hand. Terror has to be fought with terror, like what they teach at the Indian Army's Counter Insurgency & Jungle Warfare School: "Fight the guerilla like a guerilla". Replace 'guerilla' with 'terrorist'.
conclusion


There is a need to pursue a multifaceted and integrated policy and strategy for dealing with this menace. This may include action on the security front to effectively counter and check violence by Naxalites, create a secure environment and promote development and economic growth in the affected areas with the objective of providing the necessary economic and social infrastructure and employment opportunities.

No form of government has proved to be better than democracy. And Indian democracy is remarkably resilient. If the Maoists still feel differently, they must come forward to discuss the issues across the table. The government has responded to the standard charges of “inequitable and in egalitarian development”. It has come forward with a series of development proposals to address the inequity. The Maoist support to secessionist and separatist movements is misplaced and points to a garbled conception of politics. By indulging in the brazen and unprincipled acts of violence, they are not only hurting the cause of development, but are also playing into the hands of our enemies. The government, on its part, needs to strengthen the capabilities of the police and the Intelligence network